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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
    he conflict in Ukraine has once again generated concerns that interna-
tional humanitarian law (IHL) is insufficient to effectively regulate non-
international armed conflicts (NIACs). This concern is not unique to 
Ukraine, but has been an almost constant feature of international reaction 
to NIACs. Other recent examples including the conflicts in Syria, Libya 
and Iraq, serve as reminders of what are arguably two axioms of these non-
State conflicts. First, they tend to rapidly devolve into a level of brutality 
that seems to know no rational limit. Second, IHL, developed primarily to 
regulate inter-State armed conflicts, seems relatively incapable of address-
ing the realities of these conflicts in a manner that truly effectuates the goal 
of mitigating the suffering of war. 
There has been substantial progress since 1949 in filling what was at 
that time a quite significant vacuum in the international legal regulation of 
this historically pernicious category of armed conflicts. Unfortunately, rou-
tine images of the carnage associated with contemporary manifestations of 
such conflicts—in particular the suffering inflicted on civilians—indicates 
there is much work to be done to ensure that IHL’s humanitarian objec-
tives are credibly advanced during NIACs. 
There is no simple solution to the immense humanitarian challenge 
produced by these conflicts. This is merely a reflection of the reality that 
there is nothing straightforward about NIACs. Each conflict involves its 
own set of unique strategic, operational and tactical complexities, with an 
accompanying range of unique humanitarian challenges. However, IHL, 
like all bodies of regulatory law, should evolve in response to what appear 
to be consistent sources of regulatory and humanitarian failures associated 
with these conflicts. While the list of factors that contribute to the gap be-
tween humanitarian aspiration and implementation is certainly well popu-
lated, one issue that merits particular attention is the challenge of mitigating 
civilian risk resulting from the use of indirect fires and high-explosive pro-
jectiles.  
Regulating the use of lethal combat power in order to mitigate risk to 
civilians and civilian property is at the very core of IHL. And, the “funda-
mental” or “foundational” rules of IHL developed to regulate the use of 
combat power apply today across the spectrum of conflict, conflicts that 












of multiple States to lower level hostilities between State and non-State 
forces, and even to hostilities between multiple non-State forces. In fact, 
this migration of laws developed to regulate inter-State conflicts (interna-
tional armed conflicts or IACs) to the NIAC domain is frequently and 
quite appropriately lauded as one of the most significant contemporary ad-
vancements in humanitarian law. And yet the world continues to witness 
NIACs where this migration appears to produce negligible positive effect. 
How then can the regulatory and accordant humanitarian impact of this 
migration be enhanced to better produce on a more consistent basis the 
positive humanitarian outcomes the law is intended to achieve? The con-
flict in Ukraine provides the most recent, but by no means unique, lens 
through which to consider this question. Like so many other similar “inter-
nal” armed conflicts, the hostilities in Ukraine involve some of the most 
common attributes of NIACs: an eruption of violence among groups 
whose animosities have been brewing for decades; an overall lack of mili-
tary competence among the belligerents; questionable command commit-
ment to humanitarian restraint; widespread availability of highly lethal 
combat capabilities; and, most problematically, a situation that incentivizes 
unrestrained uses of these lethal tools of war in an effort to win at all costs. 
This article will focus on the perplexing question of improving the reg-
ulatory framework. First, it will consider how the incentives and disincen-
tives inherent in NIACs, like that in the Ukraine, are heavily and problem-
atically weighted against humanitarian restraint. Second, it will propose sev-
eral approaches that may contribute to more effective NIAC regulation. 
These proposals—a more effective incentive for IHL compliance, prompt 
and credible criminal sanction for war crimes, and a more meaningful un-
derstanding of the meaning of reasonableness in relation to combat judg-
ments—can build on existing law and regulation. However, they are not 
suggested as a restatement of existing law, but instead as an evolution of 
the extant rules to better address the NIAC challenge. Why do I believe 
such evolution is essential? If conflicts like the one in Ukraine signal one 
transcendent message, it is that in the context of NIACs, international law 
has failed to produce a credible balance between the necessity to employ 
deadly combat power and humanitarian protections for civilians and civil-
ian property. With war an inevitable aspect of human relations, all too un-
predictable in its permutations, but tragically all too predictable in its bru-














II.  REGULATING NIAC HOSTILITIES: TWO “LONG POLES”1 IN THE 
EFFECTIVENESS TENT 
 
In 1996, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) issued its first judgment in Prosecutor v. Tadić,2 a judgment whose 
shock effect continues to reverberate to this day. Most of the subsequent 
attention to the judgment has focused on the Tribunal’s methodology for 
assessing the existence of a NIAC, the oft-cited Tadić “elements” test.3 
While this “Tadić test” for what qualifies as a NIAC was indeed a vital con-
tribution to the interpretation and implementation of IHL, the Tribunal’s 
methodology for assessing the substantive rules applicable to NIACs was 
equally, and perhaps even more, significant in its impact on NIAC regula-
tion. 
Once the Tribunal determined that Tadić had been involved in a NI-
AC, it had to assess the substantive IHL rules that applied to that conflict; 
the rules that proscribed his individual conduct as a belligerent participant 
in the conflict.4 In one brief sentence, the Tribunal noted that many of the 
IHL rules developed to regulate IAC had, over time, “migrated” to the 
realm of NIAC.5 As a result, these rules had become binding on partici-
pants in any armed conflict, even though they were derived from treaties 
applicable exclusively to IACs. Several armed forces had, prior to that time, 
extended IAC rules to all military operations through adoption of national 
IHL-related policies, ostensibly to provide a consistent and logical regulato-
ry baseline for the training, planning and execution of any military opera-
tion.6 However, this was the first time this extension was characterized as a 
                                                                                                                      
1. See Definition of Long Pole, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://nws.merriam-
webster.com/opendictionary/newword_display_alpha.php?letter=Lo&last=50 (last visited 
May 18, 2015) (“The most important issue or problem that prevents or slows progress, 
especially on a project. The factor that must be addressed before all others or that has the 
most far-reaching effects.”).  
2. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the for-
mer Yugoslavia May 7, 1997). 
3. Id.  
4. Id., ¶¶ 580–83.  
5. Id.  
6. See Geoffrey S. Corn, Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of Armed Conflict: The Need 
to Recognize a Hybrid Category of Armed Conflict, 40 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNA-
TIONAL LAW 295, 315–20 (2006) (explaining the use of military policy directives to extend 













matter of law. In so doing, the ICTY initiated a process assessed by some 
scholars as the merger of the law of IAC and NIAC.7  
This merger was both logical and beneficial. NIACs, after all, routinely 
involve belligerent hostilities of a nature that matched, and at times exceed-
ed, the destructiveness associated with IACs. Common Article 3, while a 
critically important extension of IHL into the NIAC domain, does not in-
clude any provisions that regulated the conduct of hostilities.8 The 1977 
Additional Protocol II does include a very modest foray into the conduct 
of hostilities field of regulation, but its Article 13 provisions for the protec-
tion of the civilian population are modest in comparison to the much more 
comprehensive IAC conduct of hostilities regime.9 Furthermore, AP II is 
not universally applicable to NIACs, but rather applies only after certain 
triggering conditions are satisfied, most notably control of territory by the 
party to the conflict (an insurgent or dissident force) challenging the gov-
ernment.10 Because of this very limited NIAC treaty-based conduct of hos-
tilities regulation, extending IAC rules to NIACs seemed both logical and 
essential to begin the process of better mitigating the humanitarian suffer-
ing produced by NIACs. 
But this extension also reflected an important acknowledgment: despite 
the theretofore inapplicability of IHL conduct of hostilities regulation to 
NIACs, these armed conflicts involve military operations and hostilities 
analogous to IACs. Indeed, it was the “intensity and duration” of hostilities 
that the Tribunal identified as the key indicators that a situation had 
                                                                                                                      
7. See discussion in Andrew J. Norris & Kenneth Watkin, Preface to NON-
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY xvii, xxiii, xxxi 
(Kenneth Watkin & Andrew J. Norris eds., 2012) (Vol. 88, U.S. Naval War College Inter-
national Law Studies).  
8. See Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter GC I]; Con-
vention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Mem-
bers of Armed Forces at Sea art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter GC II]; 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 
U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC III]; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Per-
sons in Time of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC IV]. 
9. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relat-
ing to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 13, June 8, 
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP II]. 
10. See COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE 
GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bru-













crossed the threshold from an internal civil disturbance to an armed con-
flict.11 Thus, the Tadić decision reflected two critical conclusions. First, NI-
ACs, by virtue of being “armed conflicts,” involve uses of combat power. 
Second, regulation of this combat power necessitates extending rules de-
veloped for IACs into the NIAC domain due to the lacunae of applicable 
treaty regulation.12 
Today, this unified applicability of IHL regulation—most notably in re-
lation to the use of combat power to engage in hostilities—has become 
almost axiomatic. IAC-based targeting rules apply to any armed conflict, 
and provide the foundation for international criminal responsibility in both 
IACs and NIACs. Yet, the record of humanitarian suffering produced dur-
ing NIACs has not abated, but appears to be as unfortunate today as it was 
at the time Tadić was decided. NIACs still occur; combat is as intense in 
these conflicts as ever; civilians and civilian property are routinely caught in 
the NIAC crossfire; indeed, humanitarian suffering seems to be an intrac-
table problem produced during these conflicts.  
This unfortunate reality must become a focal point of IHL evolution. 
The record of humanitarian suffering associated with NIACs must contin-
ue to motivate efforts to better align what might be called the “Tadić aspira-
tion” with NIAC reality. If nothing else, proponents of conflict regulation 
must acknowledge that the gap between humanitarian aspiration and reality 
continues to be unacceptably wide, and therefore new approaches to regu-
lating NIACs must be considered. 
The solution should build on the Tadić “rule migration,” but must also 
be realistic. Proposals attenuated from the realities of armed conflict, pro-
posals that fail to account for the fundamental objective of using force to 
bring an opponent into submission, may be appealing from a humanitarian 
perspective, but will likely produce negligible positive impact. In contrast, 
once the causes of this overall failure to align aspiration with reality are bet-
ter diagnosed, adjusting existing modalities to produce a more positive cure 
may be feasible. Ultimately, the cure must be aligned with the underlying 
foundation of IHL itself: providing belligerents realistic legal maneuver 
space to enable effective execution of military operations while mitigating 
more effectively the risk to civilians and civilian property. 
 
                                                                                                                      
11. Tadić, supra note 2, ¶¶ 564–65. 












III.  INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES: HOW SOVEREIGNTY DILUTES THE 
EFFICACY OF LEGAL REGULATION 
 
Armed conflict of any nature involves mortal combat between organized 
belligerent groups, what IHL characterizes as “parties to an armed con-
flict.”13 In any such situation, human nature will almost inevitably compel 
individuals to adopt a “whatever it takes” approach to hostile confronta-
tions. IHL often demands that individuals, when thrust into armed conflict, 
subordinate this instinctual reaction, and at times even their instincts for 
self-preservation, to the interests of collective good. This is a simple conse-
quence of rules that require restraint in the conduct of hostilities. Ideally, 
these restraints will produce a collective military advantage for the military 
unit as a whole, even when they result in increased tactical level risk. In-
deed, the overall benefit derived from imposing such restraints must, to 
some extent, explain why so many nations have historically been willing to 
subject their armed forces to IHL obligations. 
Unfortunately, military forces and their commanders routinely underes-
timate the overall advantage that flows from compliance with rules that 
require tactical and operational restraint. Even among the most sophisticat-
ed armed forces, developing combat units that embrace the “force multi-
plication”14 effect of IHL compliance is a genuine challenge. It should 
therefore come as little surprise that armed groups involved in NIACs—
groups that often do not benefit from the training and developmental op-
portunities associated with sophisticated military organizations—are even 
less likely to embrace IHL compliance based on advancing their own self-
interest.  
This reality necessitates a more probing assessment of the practical in-
centives and disincentives for IHL compliance during NIACs. Such an as-
sessment may provide a partial explanation for why the gap between aspira-
tion and implementation remains so problematic, and may perhaps stimu-
late consideration of techniques to modify this incentive/disincentive equa-
tion.  
                                                                                                                      
13. Interview with Kathleen Lawand, Head of the Arms Unit, ICRC, What is a Non-
International Armed Conflict? (Oct. 12, 2012), ICRC, https://www.icrc.org/eng/re 
sources/documents/interview/2012/12-10-niac-non-international-armed-conflict.htm.  
14. Raj Rana, Contemporary Challenges in the Civil-Military Relationship: Complementarity or 
Incompatibility?, 86 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 565, 567–68 (2004), avail-












At the most fundamental level, the strategic end state of most NIACs 
suggests a much more significant disincentive for IHL compliance than 
exists in the IAC domain. IACs rarely involve a strategic objective of total 
subjugation of an enemy State, with complete and permanent substitution of 
authority over that State’s territory by the opposition force.15 Instead, IACs, 
which since 1945 have become fewer and farther between than ever before 
in modern history,16 tend to be short-duration conflicts with much more 
limited strategic objectives. Even when IACs result in the total destruction 
of an enemy armed force, such as the armed conflicts in Iraq in 2003 and 
Panama in 1989, there is an almost immediate effort to restore governance 
to host-nation authorities in order to extricate the victorious military forces 
of the invading State. 
The central strategic objective of IACs is the submission of enemy mili-
tary resistance.17 However, this rarely includes the requirement for total 
destruction of enemy armed forces. And, more importantly, a closely relat-
ed strategic objective of most IACs is the rapid and efficient restoration of 
peace, allowing for disengagement of armed forces and a return to peaceful 
mechanisms for resolving the inter-State dispute. Thus, in a very real sense, 
IACs have evolved into relatively short duration “flare ups” associated with 
ongoing inter-State disputes that influence the broader diplomatic dispute 
resolution process, but rarely completely displace that process.18 
In order to advance what might be understood as this “de-escalation” 
objective, humanitarian restraint is essential.19 Indeed, the dual objectives 
of defeating enemy military resistance while facilitating a restoration of 
peace highlights the logic of IHL, which itself seeks to balance military ne-
cessity with humanitarian restraint. History demonstrates that infliction of 
unnecessary and gratuitous suffering—suffering not objectively justified by 
                                                                                                                      
15. Steven Pinker, The Decline of War and Conceptions of Human Nature, 15 INTERNA-
TIONAL STUDIES REVIEW 400 (2013), available at http://stevenpinker.com/files/pinker 
/files/intl_studies_review.pdf. 
16. Kenneth Watkin, Humanitarian Law and 21st-Century Conflict: Three Block Wars, Ter-
rorism, and Complex Security Situations, in TESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 11 (Susan C. Breau & Agnieszka Jachec-Neale ed., 2006).  
17. Kenneth Watkin, Combatants, Unprivileged Belligerents and Conflict in the 21st Century, 1 
IDF LAW REVIEW 69, 70 (2003), available at http://hpcrresearch.org/sites/default/files 
/publications/Session2.pdf. This article was prepared as a background paper for the In-
formal High-Level Expert Meeting on the Reaffirmation and Development of Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law, held at Cambridge, January 27–29, 2003.  
18. See id. at 12–13.  












military necessity—undermines the ultimate objective of restoring peace 
while contributing little or nothing to the legitimate objective of defeating 
enemy forces.20 It is therefore unsurprising that restoration of peace is 
identified as one of the primary justifications for IHL compliance in the 
U.S. Army’s 1956 field manual entitled “The Law of Land Warfare.”21 
This closely related interest in rapid military success and restoration of 
the peaceful status quo ante does not seem to extend to the NIAC domain. 
Instead, the strategic end state of most NIACs is arguably quite different 
from that of IACs. NIACs are normally fought to either effect a separation 
of a portion of national territory from central governing authority, or to 
replace that authority with a new governing authority.22 Examples of this 
abound in recent history.23 Thus, “victory” is not defined in terms of de-
feating an enemy armed force and quickly withdrawing the victorious forc-
es from the territory as part of a political solution to the inter-State dispute 
that resulted in the military action. Instead, victory, and the accordant stra-
tegic end state, is normally defined in quite different terms. For the rebel or 
insurgent forces, victory is defined in terms of total subjugation of gov-
ernment forces, leading to independence for a breakaway entity or substitu-
tion of the governing authority.24 For government forces, victory is defined 
by total nullification of the capacity of the rebel or insurgent group to chal-
lenge the governing authority.25  
Thus, in many cases, the very nature of the NIAC struggle undermines 
the IHL compliance incentive equation. Unlike in the typical IAC, “peace 
restoration” with a return to the status quo ante will rarely be perceived as a 
                                                                                                                      
20. Laurie R. Blank & Geoffrey S. Corn, Losing the Forest for the Trees: Syria, Law, and the 
Pragmatics of Conflict Recognition, 46 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 693, 
740–41 (2013).  
21. See Department of the Army, FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare ¶ 451 (1956). 
22. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 28, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 
(1998). 
23. See, e.g., Jake Diliberto, The New War Frontier: Understanding Modern Insurgency Wars 
and the Syrian Civil War through the Iraq Insurgencies during 2006–2009, at 4 (APSA 2014 Annu-
al Meeting Paper, 2014) (discussing past military campaigns as a form of political revolt. It 
further notes Jewish revolts against the Roman Empire, the French and Spanish guerrilla 
campaigns, Mao Tse-tung’s people’s revolutions, and the French and British campaigns 
within the Middle East and African Maghreb as political revolts.). 
24. See generally id. at 7 (explaining that insurgent groups use violence as one of their 
tools, but it is not their end goal and that the violence that they employ allows them to 
gain and maintain political control).  













central strategic goal, and therefore humanitarian restraint to contribute to 
that outcome will be of minimal practical appeal. Because “total victory” 
will normally be perceived as the essential and almost exclusive strategic 
end state inherent in the nature of these armed conflicts, restraint will only 
be perceived as logical if it contributes to that outcome, or if it provides 
some other benefit for the belligerent parties.26  
It is true that the negative consequences of unjustified violence—
alienation of civilians, increasing the resolve of resisting forces and interna-
tional condemnation—should, in theory, apply to NIACs, thereby provid-
ing independent motivations for IHL compliance. However, the record of 
these conflicts suggests this is not the common perception. And this can be 
logically explained by two primary considerations. First, the external inter-
national scrutiny of the conduct of hostilities in NIACs seems generally to 
be less exacting than in IACs.27 While this may be shifting in a positive di-
rection, there is almost a sense that NIACs by their nature involve greater 
levels of brutality, and that this expectation results in a higher level of tol-
erance for IHL non-compliance. Second, because total victory provides 
parties to these conflicts the maximum protection from accountability for 
wartime misconduct, there is little to no perceived benefit in complying 
with any constraints that do not directly contribute to the total victory stra-
tegic end state.28  
International criminal responsibility for IHL violations in NIACs has, 
to a limited extent, altered this incentive equation. But the impact of inter-
national war crimes prosecutions for NIAC misconduct has arguably been 
negligible. While there have been laudable efforts to ensure accountability 
for NIAC IHL violations, the continuing propensity of participants in 
                                                                                                                      
26. Geoffrey S. Corn et al., Belligerent Targeting and the Invalidity of a Least Harmful Means 
Rule, 89 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 536, 555–56 (2013).  
27. Katharine Fortin, Does the Violence between Boko Haram and Nigerian Security Forces 
Amount to a Non-International Armed Conflict?, ARMED GROUPS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(Dec. 6, 2013), http://armedgroups-internationallaw.org/2013/12/06/does-the-violence-
between-boko-haram-and-nigerian-security-forces-amount-to-a-non-international-armed-
conflict/ (the Nigerian government had to make changes to its approach due to increasing 
international scrutiny). 
28. Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri 
Lanka, ¶¶ 83–86 (Mar. 31, 2011), available at http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus 
/Sri_Lanka/POE_Report_Full.pdf (eye witness account of heavy shelling resulting in the 
killing and wounding of a large number of civilians in Sri Lanka where there was no ac-












these conflicts to commit widespread and serious IHL violations suggests 
that these prosecutions have produced limited deterrent effect.  
Enhancing respect for IHL during NIACs requires a major adjustment 
to this incentive/disincentive equation. That adjustment should focus on 
three factors. First, international law must provide a more effective—and 
most importantly immediate—IHL compliance incentive for individual 
belligerents and the commanders who lead them. It may be that some non-
state belligerent groups will never conform their conduct to IHL obliga-
tions. However, extending the opportunity to claim combatant immunity to 
these groups holds the greatest potential for altering the existing compli-
ance incentive equation, and therefore should be considered. Second, the 
commitment to prompt, credible and effective criminal prosecutions for 
serious IHL violations must not only be sustained, it must be increased. 
Finally, in addition to these compliance enhancement measures, more at-
tention should be devoted to providing greater clarity to the assessment of 
reasonableness in relation to operational judgments—a standard that must 
frame legitimacy in combat and accountability for alleged unlawful judg-
ments. As will be discussed in Part IV, this touchstone for assessing the 
lawfulness of operational judgments should be better defined in relation to 
the use of means and methods of warfare that pose immense risk of civil-
ian harm. 
 
A. Sovereignty, Combatant Immunity and Incentivizing IHL Compliance 
 
Combatant immunity, or the so-called lawful combatant’s privilege, is fun-
damentally connected with the IAC IHL compliance equation. Since the 
inception of modern treaty-based regulation of inter-State hostilities, inter-
national law provided belligerents “qualified” as lawful combatants with the 
legal privilege to engage in hostilities. That privilege was not, however, ab-
solute. Instead, it was contingent on compliance with certain qualification 
requirements. Most notably for purposes of this analysis, these included the 
requirement to belong to an organization that conducts operations in ac-
cordance with the laws and customs of war and operates under responsible 
command.29 Even when properly qualified so as to “earn” the combatant’s 
privilege, only conduct that complies with IHL falls within this scope of 
the privilege, resulting in criminal responsibility for conduct that exceeds 
the legally recognized necessities of war. 
                                                                                                                      












This privilege/immunity construct incentivizes IHL compliance in a 
number of relatively obvious ways. First, it protects individual belligerents 
from criminal/punitive sanction for their conduct of hostilities, but only 
when their conduct complies with IHL. Second, it facilitates deterrence for 
IHL violations by emphasizing the consequences of crossing the line from 
justified to unjustified wartime conduct. Third, it imposes an obligation on 
military leaders to prepare subordinates to conduct IHL compliant opera-
tions in order to satisfy the collective qualification requirement of operating 
under “responsible command.” Fourth, it contributes to a collective sense 
of military professionalism by providing an objective manifestation of the 
legal sanction for violent wartime conduct, but only conduct that complies 
with IHL. Finally, and perhaps much more subtly, it provides individual 
belligerents with a moral touchstone to aid in navigating the brutality of 
hostilities, thereby contributing to the internalization of respect for IHL. In 
short, compliance with IHL at the individual and collective unit level pro-
vides an objective indication of legitimacy by protecting individuals from 
accusations of unlawful conduct, whereas non-compliance exposes the in-
dividuals and their units to legal condemnation for engaging in illegitimate 
wartime violence. 
This equation is inapplicable to the NIAC domain. In fact, lawful com-
batant status and its accordant combatant immunity is one of the few re-
maining aspects of IHL that is limited to IACs. From a humanitarian per-
spective, this may seem perplexing: why should the nature of the armed 
conflict dictate applicability of this legal qualification and inherent reward 
for IHL compliance? The answer seems to be rooted in the prioritization 
of sovereignty over humanitarian protection. This is a topic I addressed 
extensively in an earlier writing,30 but it necessitates a summary here in rela-
tion to this discussion of IHL compliance incentives.  
Extending lawful combatant status to a belligerent opponent obviously 
deprives the capturing State of the prerogative of punishing the individual 
for participation in hostilities. In the context of IACs, this is a compromise 
of sovereign prerogative States have long been willing to accept. The justi-
fications seem manifold, but ostensibly include enhancing protection for 
the State’s own military personnel, enhancing the likelihood of IHL com-
pliance (due to the compliance qualification requirement) and protecting 
                                                                                                                      
30. Geoffrey Corn, Thinking the Unthinkable: Has the Time Come to Offer Combatant Im-
munity to Non-State Actors?, 22 STANFORD LAW & POLICY REVIEW 253 (2011) [hereinafter 













individual soldiers from sanction for complying with the orders of their 
sovereign State, orders they rarely have the option to disobey. In short, 
combatant immunity reflects the recognition that an IAC is a State preroga-
tive, and therefore so long as the individual soldier is acting as an agent of 
the State and complying with the international laws adopted by the State, 
international law should shield the individual from punitive sanction for 
participation in hostilities. 
This equation is fundamentally different in the NIAC context. Unlike 
conflict in the international domain, during NIACs the State claims a mo-
nopoly on legal authority to impose its will on its people through the force 
of arms. This authority is not unlimited, and is qualified and regulated by 
both the State’s domestic law, and international human rights obligations 
applicable to the State’s activities. But unlike an IAC, there is no basis to 
conclude that a non-State armed opposition group shares a legal authori-
ty—and accordant privilege—to engage in hostilities against the State. As a 
result, extending lawful combatant status and combatant immunity to non-
State armed groups would result in a much more significant intrusion into 
State sovereignty than its application in IACs. From the perspective of the 
State, these individuals did not take up arms as agents of a sovereign equal, 
but instead in contravention of the most fundamental duty of citizenship: 
loyalty to the State. It should therefore be no surprise that States have been 
unwilling to extend combatant immunity to the NIAC domain, as doing so 
would deprive the State of the authority to criminally sanction those who 
take up arms in violation of this obligation. 
This presents an odd dilemma: if lawful belligerent qualification and ac-
cordant combatant immunity is limited to IACs, what is the legal status of 
government forces engaged in a NIAC? Some experts have quite properly 
challenged the assumption that these forces are, like their IAC counter-
parts, vested with lawful combatant status.31 These challenges are quite 
credible, as this status is linked to prisoner of war qualification, which, in 
turn, cannot exist in NIACs. It is probably more accurate to conclude that 
government forces are vested with a type of State immunity for lawfully 
executing the laws of the State, just as police officers are granted a legal 
privilege to use force within the limits of applicable domestic and interna-
tional law. Of course, the existence of an armed conflict will necessarily 
expand the scope of permissible conduct for these State forces beyond that 
                                                                                                                      
31. See, e.g., Sean Watts, Combatant Status and Computer Network Attack, 50 VIRGINIA 













normally permissible for police personnel. Thus, so long as State forces act 
within the framework of the applicable legal regime—in peacetime, domes-
tic law and international human rights law, with an IHL-based expansion 
during NIACs—they benefit from State derived immunity. 
Whether considered lawful combatants or State agents acting within 
the scope of their legal privilege, government forces obviously stand in a 
more favorable legal position than their non-State counterparts during NI-
ACs. But the ultimate benefit of their status as State agents is contingent on 
the government prevailing in the struggle. If the non-State opposition forc-
es prevail and are able to impose their will on the existing government, ei-
ther by establishing regional independence or by overthrowing government 
authority, the domestic legal advantage of government forces may be nulli-
fied and insurgent forces will reap the benefit of the legal immunity that 
will almost certainly flow from victory. Thus, unlike IAC participants who 
benefit from an equitable application of both legal privilege and legal obli-
gation, NIAC participants face a genuine “all or nothing” equation: those 
belonging to the victorious party will reap practical immunity for their war-
time conduct by the governing authority on whose behalf they fought, and 
the forces of the losing party will face the risk of legal condemnation and 
punitive sanction for their participation in the hostilities. 
IHL and international criminal law have attempted to modify this equa-
tion by imposing international criminal accountability upon all parties to 
NIACs regardless of which party prevailed in the conflict. In fact, account-
ability efforts have even commenced during the struggle when the outcome 
of conflict was far from certain. But the impact of these efforts, as noted 
above, has not seemed to have significantly altered this incen-
tive/disincentive equation. In short, unlike participants in an IAC, armed 
groups in NIACs have a much more tangible self-interest in total victory: 
an outcome that will substantially reduce the risk that conduct during the 
armed conflict will become the subject of legal investigation, prosecution 
and punitive condemnation. The persuasive impact of potential second- 
and third-order consequences of IHL violations—alienation of the civilian 
population, increased resistance among opponents and international con-
demnation—will therefore be degraded by the compelling incentive for 
total victory. 
At the most basic level, all of this boils down to a simple question: why 
should a NIAC armed group commit to IHL compliance? Unless such 
commitment will produce an immediate and obvious contribution to total 












and members of such armed groups will often perceive IHL compliance as 
impeding their ability to achieve total victory—the outcome that provides 
the greatest probability of immunity for their wartime conduct—
compliance will be perceived as illogical. One need only consider the bru-
tality of those groups engaged in the Syrian NIAC to illustrate this point. 
Incentivizing IHL compliance in NIACs, as in IACs, will never be an easy 
task; however, the painfully obvious humanitarian risk inherent in NIACs 
compels reconsideration of the balance between sovereignty and humanity 
inherent in the inapplicability of combatant immunity during NIACs.  
Extending this immunity to NIACs, if linked to requirements that in-
centivize IHL compliance, could fundamentally alter the existing incen-
tive/disincentive equation. Belligerent forces belonging to all parties to a 
NIAC, and perhaps more importantly their leaders, would know from the 
outset of hostilities that IHL respect will reap a significant individual and 
collective benefit: protection from punitive sanction, no matter what the 
outcome of the conflict. Perhaps more importantly, the risk of punitive 
sanction for participation in the conflict will be limited to accountability for 
IHL violations, potentially enhancing the deterrent effect. Instead of the 
current situation where sanction is a risk inherent in defeat, the key to legal 
immunity, and by implication the legitimacy of individual and collective 
military operations, will be IHL compliance. 
As I noted in my earlier writing, extending combatant immunity to 
NIACs will be no panacea, and its impact on respect for IHL would almost 
certainly be incremental.32 But doing so would more effectively and ration-
ally align the benefits of compliance with the consequences of non-
compliance by limiting criminal liability to IHL violations. In so doing, 
such an extension would enhance the symmetry between IHL aspiration 
and implementation, and would render condemnation for IHL violations 
more meaningful. This is because these condemnations would, unlike to-
day, be based on an underlying premise that IHL compliance produces an 
individual reward. Thus, the moral invalidity of IHL violations is exacer-
bated precisely because IHL would not only provide the legal basis to sub-
ject the individual to sanction, but would also provide the legal basis to 
grant the individual a reward for compliance. 
The beneficial impact of extending combatant immunity to NIACs 
would be contingent on the feasibility and probability that non-State bellig-
erents comply with IHL qualification requirements. As explained in my 
                                                                                                                      












previous writing, it is likely that this extension may fail to produce an in-
creased commitment to LOAC compliance. The very nature of NIACs 
suggests that wearing distinctive symbols recognizable at a distance, carry-
ing arms openly and restricting hostilities to lawful objects of attack may all 
be counter-intuitive to insurgent tactics.33 But this is not always the case, 
and at least offering non-State belligerents the opportunity to reap the com-
pliance immunity reward would provide non-State group leaders with an 
incentive to transition into operations that allow for compliance with these 
requirements. And, as noted above, should they fail to comply, their opera-
tions would be discredited in a more meaningful way, precisely because of 
the benefit offered in exchange for these IHL compliance measures. 
Even acknowledging the inherent limitations on how effective such an 
extension might be for enhancing IHL respect in the NIAC domain, the 
simple truth is that it would improve, even modestly, the IHL compliance 
incentive structure that currently exists. The price for such an extension 
would be the compromise to sovereignty resulting from an inability to pun-
ish non-State actors for participating in hostilities against the State.34 This is 
not insignificant, and, indeed, has been the primary obstacle preventing this 
extension when previously proposed.35 But the evolution of NIAC law 
since 1949 reflects a continuing shift of priority from protection of sover-
eignty to humanitarian protection.36 Accordingly, extending an IAC con-
cept to NIACs in order to prioritize humanitarian protection over the sov-
ereign prerogative to sanction NIAC participants is consistent with this 
trend. Therefore, more effort must be devoted to extending the IAC quid 
pro quo—exchanging IHL compliance measures for the promise of combat-
ant immunity—to the NIAC domain. 
  
B.  Doubling Down on War Crimes Accountability 
 
Extending combatant immunity to NIAC participants will provide a more 
meaningful incentive for IHL compliance. However, the compliance equa-
tion must also be addressed from the other end of the spectrum: enhancing 
the disincentive for IHL violations. Because of the very real risk that forces 
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engaged in NIACs will perceive IHL compliance as an impediment to 
achieving their strategic end state of total victory, the importance of deter-
ring IHL violations through a meaningful risk of criminal accountability is 
arguably more significant in relation to NIACs than even in IACs.  
Unfortunately, it is difficult to ignore the reality that the deterrent ef-
fect of criminal accountability for NIAC IHL violations has been under-
mined by the complexity of bringing these cases to trial.37 There has cer-
tainly been a laudable commitment of substantial resources in pursuit of 
international accountability for serious IHL violations in NIACs (such as 
those in the former Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone, Lebanon, Rwanda and Cam-
bodia).38 However, the record of brutality in contemporary NIACs contin-
ues to shock the world. While these efforts have made substantial positive 
contributions to the general concept of individual criminal responsibility 
for NIAC war crimes, the cumbersome process of advancing cases from 
investigation to conviction and punishment has arguably diluted their de-
terrent effect. Other alternatives, such as hybrid tribunals and reliance on 
domestic tribunals, represent an improvement to the status quo,39 although 
it is yet to be seen if the deterrent effect of the law will be substantially en-
hanced by these efforts. 
Deterrence is not the exclusive purpose of criminal accountability. 
However, in relation to NIACs, deterrence resulting from a meaningful risk 
of criminal sanction for IHL violations provides an especially important 
disincentive to ignore the law. And, when connected with the doctrine of 
command and superior responsibility, this deterrent effect also offers an 
important incentive for leaders to discharge their duty to ensure subordi-
nates conduct IHL compliant operations. Reducing the existing disparity 
between prosecutable IHL violations and ultimate sanction for such viola-
tions will enhance the deterrent effect of international criminal law. Be-
cause there are so few disincentives for non-compliance with IHL in NI-
ACs, this seems especially important in seeking to enhance the protection 
of potential war victims. 
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While a comprehensive discussion of steps that might contribute to 
achieving this objective is beyond the scope of this article, three seem espe-
cially relevant. First, there should be a conscious and deliberate movement 
away from reliance on international tribunals in favor of national invoca-
tion of universal jurisdiction to bring NIAC war criminals to account. Sec-
ond, the widely held assumption that civilian tribunals are the best, if not 
exclusive, forum to adjudicate accusations of IHL violations should be re-
considered. Finally, there should be a greater willingness to recognize and 
accept that acquittals in war crimes prosecutions are not necessarily mani-
festations of accountability failures or validations of the alleged miscon-
duct.  
International criminal tribunals have—and must continue to play—an 
important role in accountability for war crimes in both IACs and NIACs. 
However, most likely because of the high profile nature of the establish-
ment and use of such tribunals in the past several decades, there seems to 
be a tendency to view these tribunals as the forum of choice for war crimes 
prosecutions. This is not only inconsistent with the International Criminal 
Court’s (ICC) foundational complementarity principle;40 it is also unfortu-
nate. It is unfortunate because this assumption may be diluting the interest 
and willingness of individual States to leverage their own legal systems to 
bring war criminals to account.  
Nor is the concept of complementarity—a concept central to the cred-
ibility of the ICC41—an adequate response to the concern that States are 
unwilling to leverage their criminal jurisdiction to contribute to NIAC ac-
countability. Complementarity focuses almost exclusively on the interaction 
of the ICC and States vis-à-vis accountability for their own nationals.42 
While this concept anticipates that States will perceive a substantial interest 
in utilizing their own legal systems to adjudicate war crimes accusations 
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against their nationals, it does not address the broader issue of States exer-
cising universal jurisdiction43 to contribute to accountability for NIAC war 
crimes committed by individuals with whom they have no nationality or 
territorial connection. 
Broader commitment to exercising this type of jurisdiction over indi-
viduals suspected of committing serious IHL violations during NIACs 
could contribute—potentially significantly—to mitigating the proverbial 
“flash to bang” time between violations and accountability. Enhancing 
prosecutorial efficiency will inevitably contribute to general deterrence, as 
individuals will perceive a more direct relationship between their wartime 
misconduct and potential sanction. While exercising universal jurisdiction 
over such individuals is politically and diplomatically sensitive, the substan-
tial evolution of the internationally accepted scope of NIAC war crimes 
liability, most notably in the form of the crimes adopted in the ICC Statute, 
arguably mitigates these concerns. This enumeration supports the credibil-
ity of exercising universal jurisdiction by helping limit the potential variance 
between different States’ prosecution of war crimes to matters of proce-
dure rather than the substance of the crimes.44 And, assuming State crimi-
nal process complies with fundamental international human rights obliga-
tions, no defendant should be denied a fair trial. 
There are also substantial logistical and practical impediments to assert-
ing universal jurisdiction in relation to NIACs that have no connection 
with the prosecuting State. But when an individual suspected of serious 
NIAC war crimes is found within the jurisdiction of another State, assert-
ing universal jurisdiction will contribute to general deterrence by signaling 
to potential war criminals that their future jeopardy is not linked exclusively 
to the inclination of their own State to hold them to account. In an era 
when movement of peoples between national borders is more significant 
than ever before, States should devote greater attention to establishing the 
necessary domestic legal frameworks for exercising such jurisdiction.  
This leads to the second issue: reconsidering the widespread assump-
tion that war crimes should, or even must, be prosecuted by civilian tribu-
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nals.45 While there is no legal or practical invalidity to the use of civilian 
tribunals to adjudicate war crimes accusations, there is also no reason to 
assume that military tribunals are unable to contribute to this accountability 
effort. Unfortunately, the widespread assumption that military jurisdiction 
cannot be exercised in a fundamentally fair manner has not only contribut-
ed to the assumed necessity of reliance on civilian tribunals, but has also 
led many States to eliminate military criminal jurisdiction altogether.46 
This is unfortunate. Military tribunals have played a central role 
throughout history in war crimes accountability.47 This is unsurprising, as 
IHL violations at their core involve breaches of standards of professional, 
disciplined and honorable military conduct. Military tribunals arguably pos-
sess a high level of competence to adjudicate accusations of war crimes 
precisely because they are composed of members of the profession of 
arms. When established pursuant to a legal framework that guarantees the 
accused individual will receive a fundamentally fair trial in adjudicating ac-
cusations of internationally accepted criminal proscriptions, these tribunals 
can make a significant contribution to accountability efforts. Indeed, their 
competence in the military operational art may actually contribute to great-
er overall efficiency in the adjudication process, and the credibility of out-
comes.  
Finally, advancing the interests of both conflict regulation and war 
crimes accountability means the international community must be more 
willing to accept acquittals when prosecuting alleged war criminals. There 
must be increased recognition and acknowledgment that while IHL plays a 
vital role in both the regulation of hostilities and accountability for war 
crimes, its function in these two domains is distinct.48 Standards of compli-
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ance in the regulatory domain will not always align with standards to estab-
lish criminal culpability in the accountability domain.49 Hence there will be 
situations where acts contrary to IHL’s regulatory framework do not result 
in criminal liability. Failing to recognize this legal reality and conflating the 
function of the law in these distinct domains risks serious negative conse-
quences. 
First, prosecutors must be willing to bring hard cases to trial. Establish-
ing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, especially in relation to complex oper-
ational judgments, is a daunting task. If prosecutors and the States they 
serve are unwilling to accept the risk of acquittals, they will be inclined to 
gravitate towards only the most blatant war crimes. Because targeting 
judgments will rarely fall within this category, this may produce an “ac-
countability gap” into which most conduct of hostilities incidents will fall. 
If enhancing protection against the harmful effects of highly destructive 
combat power, most notably artillery and other indirect fire systems, is an 
important objective of IHL compliance, these cases must be pursued when 
there is credible evidence indicating a violation. However, because eviden-
tiary uncertainty will and must always favor the accused in a war crimes 
prosecution50—an axiomatic consequence of the presumption of innocence 
and the burden of proof—prosecutors and the broader international com-
munity must accept the difficulty in proving such cases and the inherent 
risk of acquittals. 
Second, tribunals must be alert to the risk that the standard of proof to 
convict might be subtly diluted in order to facilitate outcomes. Proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt—the internationally accepted standard of proof 
required to rebut an accused’s presumption of innocence51—must define 
the applicability of IHL standards in the criminal accountability domain. 
Tribunals adjudicating war crimes allegations, especially in relation to com-
plex operational judgments, must be true to this standard and avoid the 
temptation to substitute a regulatory standard of compliance for this crimi-
nal axiom. Conflating the function of the law in these distinct domains 
risks undermining the credibility of war crimes outcomes, which in turn 
will undermine the deterrent effect of the law. In short, acquittals based on 
a failure to meet the high standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt will 
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contribute more to accountability than convictions based on an implicit 
dilution of that standard in order to offset the inherent uncertainty associ-
ated with operational—and especially targeting—judgments. 
In many ways, the ICTY’s controversial decision in Prosecutor v. 
Gotovina52 illustrates these risks. From the perspective of those supporting 
General Gotovina, the Trial Chamber’s determination to convict him led to 
a substitution of a regulatory standard for the criminal burden of proof of 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.53 From the perspective of those support-
ing the Trial Chamber’s judgment, the imposition of an acquittal by the 
Appeals Chamber signaled a problematic endorsement of the manner in 
which Gotovina employed indirect fires during Operation Storm.54 There is 
probably merit in both critiques. Having been closely associated with the 
defense effort, I continue to believe that the acquittal was a proper applica-
tion of a criminal standard of proof, that the totality of the evidence did not 
exclude every fair and rational hypothesis other than guilt. However, this 
should not be interpreted as an endorsement of the overall tactical and op-
erational employment of indirect fires during that operation. From a regu-
latory perspective, it is relatively easy to identify measures that could have 
enhanced both the legality and efficacy of the use of these weapon systems. 
Ultimately, the case ought not to be viewed as a failure of the accountabil-
ity process, but instead as an example of the complexity of translating regu-
latory targeting rules into the basis for a criminal conviction. Only by trying 
cases such as this, with all the inherent risks of acquittal, will complex tar-
geting judgments be subjected to meaningful accountability.  
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IV.  ALLOWING CHILDREN TO PLAY WITH BIG KID TOYS—THE USE OF 
INDIRECT FIRES AND HIGH EXPLOSIVE PROJECTILES IN NIACS 
 
The Gotovina case also provided an example of what is emerging as a focal 
point of NIAC IHL concern: protecting civilians from the effects of artil-
lery and other indirect fire weapon systems.55 Because NIACs frequently 
involve combat in densely populated areas, the question of how to enhance 
protection of civilians exposed to the risk of such methods and means of 
warfare is indeed particularly urgent. How the law evolves to address the 
use of these weapon systems in areas placing civilians at risk is therefore 
likely to increase as a focal point of international legal and public attention. 
The conflict in Ukraine—most notably destruction caused by the use of 
rocket artillery56—has been particularly significant in focusing attention on 
this issue. 
More effective regulation of indirect fires in NIACs is inevitably com-
plex and multi-faceted. Many observers believe that the status quo must be 
reconsidered, with an increasing number of experts calling for a complete 
prohibition against use of these weapon systems in populated areas.57 Such 
use by belligerent groups in NIACs has unquestionably raised concerns 
about the ability of the law to balance the interests of military necessity and 
humanitarian protection. But a ban is not the solution. Any evolution of 
the law to respond to the risk to civilians created by indirect fires must be 
responsive to both military and humanitarian concerns; responsiveness that 
will be central to the credibility and efficacy of this evolution. 
Any effort to improve the legal regulation of indirect fires in NIACs 
must begin with an important, although for many frustrating, acknowledg-
ment: belligerents will always seek to leverage the means of warfare they 
possess to produce optimal tactical and operational effects. While this 
might seem obvious, proposals to completely ban the use of indirect fires 
in population centers reflect a distortion of the central balance of IHL in-
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terests.58 No one can dispute the risk to civilians created by such use, but 
NIACs are an increasingly urban form of warfare for the simple reason that 
operational centers of gravity are routinely co-mingled with civilian popula-
tions.59 Because of this, belligerents will seek—indeed often must seek—to 
leverage their combat power against targets mixed among the civilian 
population. In short, population centers are and will continue to be the tac-
tical focal point of combat operations during both IACs and NIACs. So 
there is no question that efforts to enhance the civilian protection effect of 
IHL in relation to the use of indirect fires in population centers are lauda-
ble, but advocating for a complete ban is unrealistic and potentially coun-
terproductive. The challenge is how to achieve this goal?  
It should already be obvious that proposals to completely ban such use 
are not, in the opinion of this author, the answer. In fact, such an approach 
to advancing protection of civilians is so misguided that it risks doing more 
damage than good. Instead, the focal point of this effort should be on en-
hancing the efficacy of existing IHL targeting rules, with a particular em-
phasis on the targeting touchstone of reasonableness. By providing greater 
clarity to the substantive meaning of this term—especially in the context of 
NIACs and in relation to the use of indirect fires—commanders will be 
better informed about the nature of IHL constraints and the broader inter-
national community will be better able to credibly critique and, where ap-
propriate, condemn use of these weapon systems. 
 
A. Banning Use of Indirect Fires in Populated Areas 
 
The harm inflicted upon civilians and civilian property by the use of indi-
rect fires in populated areas—the central and decisive issue in the Gotovina 
case60—has generated a growing movement to restrict or prohibit such 
use.61 This movement is motivated by not only the undeniable destructive 
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effect of high explosive projectiles when used in populated areas, but also 
by the perception that the existing IHL targeting framework is too vague 
and uncertain to provide meaningful and effective regulation of these 
weapon systems.62 One report proposes to generally limit the use of these 
weapons in densely populated areas.63   
A complete prohibition against use of artillery and other indirect fire 
weapons in populated areas may seem appealing from the perspective of 
humanitarian protection, but it is unrealistic and potentially counter-
productive. Banning the use of weapon systems that are widely available 
and operationally appealing in a particular context presents immense en-
forceability problems. Indirect fires offer belligerents immense tactical and 
operational value in any context. Although it is beyond the scope of this 
article to address this value in depth, suffice it to say that every military or-
ganization in modern history—both State and non-State—has sought to 
possess these weapons and to leverage their power during conflict; indeed, 
such weapon systems are colloquially known in the U.S. military as the 
“King of Battle.”64 This simple reality, coupled with the reality that indirect 
fire systems are routinely available to even emerging belligerent groups, 
makes it difficult to imagine how the international community could com-
pel respect for a complete ban. 
Enforceability is not the only consideration that undermines the credi-
bility of the total or even partial ban approach. Overall, it is just one of four 
especially significant flaws with either option. First, unlike other means of 
warfare that have been subject to complete bans—most notably chemical 
weapons65—a ban on the use of indirect fire weapons in only certain con-
texts will not result in eliminating these weapons from the arsenals of po-
tential belligerents. Instead, armed forces and other organized armed 
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groups will continue to develop, procure and use these weapons where 
permissible even if a partial ban were implemented. How would compli-
ance with a “use only” ban be effective when armed forces would constant-
ly have access to a weapon system that offers such immense potential op-
erational advantage in any context? Indirect fires are used to produce ef-
fects; where these effects must be produced is always dictated by a range of 
operational considerations, including friendly capabilities and enemy dispo-
sition.66 Restricting use in certain areas is inconsistent with this most fun-
damental military logic, because it makes one consideration dispositive and 
ignores the possibility that the most decisive targets might be located in the 
most restricted area immune from any other feasible alternative attack op-
tion. The proclivity of belligerents engaged in modern conflicts to use indi-
rect fires in both populated and sparsely populated areas indicates that ef-
fects-based employment cannot turn on arbitrary geographic constraints, 
and demonstrates ultimately how unrealistic such an expectation is. In 
short, it is almost impossible to imagine that military commanders are go-
ing to forego the advantages offered by indirect fires when the alternatives 
are operationally ineffective. Instead, their instincts and the pressures of 
mission accomplishment will compel the exact opposite approach. 
Second, a complete prohibition against the use of indirect fires in 
populated areas will almost inevitably invite disparate application between 
advanced and less-advanced armed forces, leading to a perception of in-
consistent and hypocritical obligations. Modern militaries covet combat 
capabilities that allow for stand-off precision engagement of enemy targets. 
It is also a virtual axiom of contemporary asymmetrical warfare that they 
expect their less competent opponents to utilize every available technique 
to offset the inherent military advantage offered by advanced weaponry 
and target acquisition systems, which routinely includes co-mingling vital 
military objectives among the civilian population. Indeed, the need to effec-
tively strike such targets while minimizing risk to civilians and civilian 
property has been a primary driving force behind the evolution of precision 
stand-off strike capability.67  
                                                                                                                      
66. See Headquarters, Department of Army, FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Opera-
tions 5–7 (1997), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/doctrine/genesis_and_evolution/ 
source_materials/FM-101-5_staff_organization_and_operations.pdf.  
67. Tim Cathcart, Standoff Ethics: Policy Considerations for the Use of Standoff Weapons, 2004 













Because of this, it is almost inconceivable that States that possess or 
aspire to these capabilities will be willing to commit to a complete ban on 
their use whenever they fall into a restricted populated area. Indeed, it is in 
these areas where the weapon systems will be considered to provide maxi-
mum operational advantage. And, based on the recognition that there will 
never be a limitless supply of precision munitions, coupled with the expec-
tation that future warfare will be increasingly urban in nature,68 it is equally 
unlikely that States will commit to even a limited or partial ban on the use 
of such weapons. However, in the improbable event some restriction on 
such weapons does gain momentum, it is almost inevitable these States will 
direct the regulatory focus not on the means of warfare, but the method of 
use. For example, a more limited approach might seek to restrict the use of 
“dumb” munitions in a populated area when fires are unobserved, or might 
seek to restrict the use of “dumb” munitions altogether.69  
It is apparent, however, that these types of restrictions would favor 
technologically advanced armed forces. Because of this, other opponents 
would perceive them as inequitable, undermining the likelihood they would 
be adopted or respected. Any belligerent group unable to field the type of 
capability or employ the type of tactics allowing for the use of indirect fires 
in populated areas in accordance with technologically focused regulation 
would seek to leverage its more limited capability to achieve, as best it 
could, tactical and operational parity with the more advanced opponent. 
This has been a common aspect of contemporary warfare. Ultimately, the 
efficacy of a total or even partial restriction option is dubious because of 
these considerations: it is almost inconceivable that States fielding ad-
vanced military capabilities will forego the opportunity to employ precision 
stand-off strike capabilities; and it is equally inconceivable to expect that 
less advanced opponents will forego leveraging all available combat re-
sources to achieve tactical and operational parity in response to a more ad-
vanced military opponent. 
Implementing and enforcing a total or limited restriction option is the 
third significant flaw in this approach. Implementation will require clear 
                                                                                                                      
68. See Borrie & Brehm, supra note 62, at 812–17. 
69. These types of “method” restrictions are more likely to be tolerable to States that 
routinely impose similar restrictions on their own forces as a matter of policy, for example 
through imposition of restrictive rules of engagement (although it must be noted that even 
these ROE-based restrictions, while common in contemporary conflict, are often qualified 
by allowing for exceptions when friendly forces are in direct contact and no other viable 












definitions of both the weapons falling within the constraint and the con-
text in which they are restricted. Starting with the context challenge, what 
qualifies as a “populated area”? This has always been a difficult question in 
relation to rules of engagement (ROE) -based restrictions on the use of in-
direct fires.70 In the ROE context the military commander imposing the 
restriction is vested with the discretion to define “populated area” on a 
mission-by-mission basis,71 but no such flexibility could feasibly be incor-
porated into a legal ban or restriction. Instead, that approach would require 
consensus on the definition of populated or civilian area. 
Modern warfare is increasingly urban in nature, and this is especially 
true in the context of NIACs.72 Non-State belligerent groups are likely to 
continue, and perhaps increase, reliance on close proximity to civilian pop-
ulation centers to sustain their efforts.73 This will produce a high probabil-
ity that operational centers of gravity in these conflicts will be in areas 
where civilians and civilian property are located. At what point would the 
presence of civilians or civilian property in proximity to lawful objects of 
attack trigger a restriction or prohibition on indirect fires or other high ex-
plosive munitions? If the answer is “anytime,” the definition would essen-
tially nullify the effectiveness of these weapon systems—when properly 
employed—to address what are frequently some of the most valuable tar-
gets in the conflict. If the answer is anything other than “anytime,” it pro-
duces an inherent inconsistency, because it tolerates subjecting some civil-
ians to risk while protecting others contingent on where they happen to be 
located at any given time. Thus, unlike the ROE approach, which tailors 
restrictions to the variables of mission, enemy, time, resources and overall 
civilian risk assessment, any complete prohibition would have to be found-
ed on a “populated area” judgment, which will almost inevitably be over-
broad and under-inclusive at the same time, including areas where the op-
erational necessity for use of indirect fires objectively outweighs civilian 
                                                                                                                      
70. See John R. McQueney Jr., MACV’s Dilemma: Changes for the United States and the 
Conduct of War on the Ground in Vietnam in 1968, in AN ARMY AT WAR: CHANGE IN THE 
MIDST OF CONFLICT 255 (John J. McGarth ed., 2005) (describing the uncertainty sur-
rounding the definitions of “populated area” and “urban area” within the rules of en-
gagement).  
71. See INTERNATIONAL & OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVO-
CATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER & SCHOOL, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 84–87 
(2012) [hereinafter OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK], available at http://www.loc.gov/rr 
/frd/Military_Law/pdf/operational-law-handbook_2012.pdf. 
72. See Borrie & Brehm, supra note 62, at 812–17. 












risk based on existing targeting norms, and excluding less populated areas 
where risk to civilians is still significant. 
Enforcement of such a prohibition will present equally complex chal-
lenges. As noted above, because such an approach will seek to restrict the 
use of weapon systems commonly included within the arsenal of most bel-
ligerent parties (as opposed to eliminating the weapon systems altogether), 
there will be immense pressure on commanders and other operational deci-
sion makers to employ these systems in response to perceived operational 
necessity. Expecting belligerents to forego the advantages offered by indi-
rect fires and other high explosive munitions in populated areas is unrealis-
tic, because the expectation fails to account for the military advantage con-
sideration of the utilization equation. Where there is little military ad-
vantage to be gained by such use, there is, of course, a higher probability of 
compliance. But where the advantage lies in using these weapon systems, 
the temptation to use them will be immense, and compliance far less likely. 
Enforcement of such a use prohibition will therefore present signifi-
cant practical challenges, challenges that will be exacerbated whenever the 
prohibition is perceived as fundamentally inconsistent with military opera-
tional considerations. Compliance with rules related to means and methods 
of warfare is significantly enhanced when the effect of such rules is aligned 
with military operational logic. This balance is manifested in numerous 
provisions of customary and conventional IHL. Examples include military 
necessity,74 military objective,75 proportionality76 and the authority to pre-
ventively detain enemy belligerents.77 Even humanitarian obligations serve 
an underlying military utilitarian purpose. These protections are derived 
from the reasoned judgment of the profession of arms that unnecessary 
violence, destruction and suffering will ultimately undermine the strategic 
                                                                                                                      
74. See OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 71, at 11 (“military necessity justi-
fies the use of force required to accomplish a lawful mission”). 
75. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relat-
ing to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 52(2), June 8, 1977, 
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I] (“Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. 
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whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at 
the time, offers a definite military advantage.”). 
76. See id., art. 57 (requiring parties to a conflict to “refrain from deciding to launch 
any attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, 
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation 
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purpose of armed conflict: restoration of peace. Because armed forces are 
primarily responsible for effective IHL implementation, IHL compliance 
will invariably be facilitated where the dictates of the law comport with mil-
itary operational considerations. 
IHL is replete with examples of this symmetry between humanitarian 
regulation and military operational logic. A quintessential example is the 
prohibition against the infliction of superfluous injury or unnecessary suf-
fering.78 This prohibition is a fundamental principle of the law, tracing its 
roots back to the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868.79 By prohibiting the 
calculated infliction of superfluous suffering or injury, the principle ad-
vances not only a humanitarian purpose, but also the military logic reflect-
ed in the concept of economy of force. There is no military value in wast-
ing resources for the purpose of exacerbating the suffering of an opponent 
already rendered combat ineffective, and this principle of law is consistent 
with such logic. Another example is the rule restricting attacks only to mili-
tary objectives. While there may be definitional uncertainty on the fringes 
of the rule when it is operationally applied, the underlying premise is mili-
tarily sound: limiting the application of combat power to those persons, 
places or things that contribute to achieving operational objectives. A re-
source conscience commander should instinctively avoid wasting resources 
on targets of no operational or tactical significance, and this rule is con-
sistent with that logic. 
Most targeting rules fall within the scope of this symmetry because they 
facilitate employing combat power in a manner that contributes to the 
prompt submission of enemy military forces, while restricting the use of 
such power when the effect will make little or no contribution to that ob-
jective. As a result, well-trained commanders and properly led subordinates 
                                                                                                                      
78. 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW r. 70 (Weapons of a Na-
ture to Cause Superfluous Injury or Unnecessary Suffering), (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & 
Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005), available at https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng 
/docs/v1_rul_rule70 (last visited Jan. 15, 2015) (“The use of means and methods of war-
fare which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering is prohibit-
ed.”); Institute of International Law, Oxford Manual of the Laws of War on Land art. 9(a) 
(1880), reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 29 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman 
eds., 4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter Oxford Manual] (“It is forbidden [t]o employ arms, projec-
tiles, or materials of any kind calculated to cause superfluous suffering, or to aggravate 
wounds . . . .”).  
79. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 
400 Grammes Weight, Dec. 11, 1868, 138 Consol. T.S. 297 (stating as its object the bar-
ring of the “employment of arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, 












are more likely to plan and conduct combat operations in an IHL compli-
ant manner. However, this type of instinctive compliance is far less likely 
when commanders perceive the impact of an IHL rule to be fundamentally 
incompatible with basic military logic because it significantly compromises 
the ability to bring enemy military forces into submission. 
A total ban or even significant restriction against the use of indirect 
fires and other high explosives in populated areas will fall into the latter 
category, and almost certainly be perceived as attenuated from military log-
ic. This is because use of indirect fires and other high explosives will often 
be assessed as a weapon system to produce essential—if not decisive—
effects against enemy forces. As a result, effective enforcement will be 
much more challenging than it is in relation to the existing IHL targeting 
framework. And, considering that the record of compliance with even this 
framework is less than ideal, the prospects are not good. This will likely 
shift the implementation focus to post-hoc accountability. But this will only 
add to the already substantial challenge of reliance on war crimes prosecu-
tions as a primary focal point for NIAC IHL compliance. 
The fourth significant flaw in the total or significant ban approach is 
that it may actually be counterproductive, in fact increasing risk to civilians 
and civilian property. If such a rule were adopted, it would create a very 
high probability that operations in populated areas would involve ground 
maneuver and close combat. FIBUA (Fighting in Built Up Areas) is the 
current U.S. military doctrinal term for these types of operations, which are 
also frequently referred to as MOUT (Military Operations in Urban Ter-
rain).80 It is precisely because such operations pose immense risk to both 
friendly forces and civilians that commanders are trained to avoid this 
method of warfare whenever operationally and legally feasible.81  
Indeed, it is probably no exaggeration to characterize this avoidance 
principle as an axiom of military operational art. This is because engaging 
an enemy in built up or urban terrain is considered among the most diffi-
cult combat situations a commander may encounter. Such operations cede 
to the defender the natural advantage provided by the use of the urban ter-
                                                                                                                      
80. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-21.10, The Infantry Rifle Compa-
ny, at Glossary-2 (2006), available at http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs 
/dr_a/pdf/fm3_21x10.pdf (defining FIBUA); Headquarters, Department of the Army, 
FM 6-20, Fire Support in the Airland Battle, at Glossary-7 (1988), available at http:// 
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81. See Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-60, Joint Targeting, at I-8 












rain for cover, concealment and overall tactical advantage.82 The built up 
environment degrades the effectiveness of fires and maneuver.83 It also 
creates an extremely high risk to civilians and civilian property in area of 
hostilities, which adds an undesired element of uncertainty into the target 
engagement process.84 
History is replete with examples from which this principle is derived. 
From Stalingrad to Hue to Fallujah, built up areas have historically been 
considered the most undesired terrain on which to engage an enemy with 
ground combat power.85 Nonetheless, for an attacking commander, there is 
an unfortunate inverse relationship between built up areas and defensive 
operations. Because of the difficulty of dislodging forces from such areas, 
and the proximity to essential resources a defending commander derives 
from built up areas, defenders obtain a force multiplication benefit from 
emplacing positions in such areas. 
Bypassing such areas is not always feasible, and when absolutely neces-
sary assault into built up areas may have to occur. However, if alternatives 
to ground assault are viable, a commander would be derelict in not consid-
ering and ultimately employing them. For example, a commander may 
choose to use indirect fire assets to disrupt enemy forces in a built up area 
during bypass operations, or to fix them in the area so that they cannot en-
danger friendly forces during the bypass. Or, a commander may need to 
disrupt command and control and/or sustainment efforts emanating from 
a built up area while concentrating forces on other objectives outside that 
area. These are just two simplistic examples of the legitimate military ad-
vantage that might result from using fires as an alternative to ground ma-
neuver to target enemy capabilities in built up areas; others abound. De-
priving commanders of the indirect fires option will almost certainly result 
in a significant increase in FIBUA operations. Because of the risk to civil-
ians inherent in this alternative, the proverbial cure may actually be worse 
than the disease. 
While adding a new rule to the existing IHL targeting framework to 
enhance protection of civilians and civilian property from the effects of 
indirect fires and high explosives is, therefore, ill advised, the goal of en-
hancing civilian protection remains valid. A more effective approach is via-
                                                                                                                      
82. See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-06, Joint Urban Operations, at I-7 
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83. See id. at I-6, I-7. 
84. See id. at I-6. 












ble: enhance the humanitarian effect of the existing IHL targeting frame-
work. And the focal point of this approach is one word: reasonable. 
  
B. Rethinking the Element of “Reasonableness” in the Implementation of IAC-Based 
Targeting Norms 
 
As noted above, the Tadić judgment concluded that many IHL treaty rules 
developed for the regulation of IACs had over time “migrated” to the 
realm of NIACs.86 Because of the overall paucity of targeting regulation 
included in the NIAC treaty regime—Common Article 3 to the four Gene-
va Conventions87 and Additional Protocol II88—this conclusion was widely 
endorsed as a rational and justifiable approach to ensure the effective regu-
lation of methods and means of warfare in the NIAC domain. And this has 
indeed been a beneficial effect of the decision: the rule migration concept 
has been instrumental in filling the vacuum of NIAC legal regulation. It 
also provided support for the International Committee of the Red Cross’s 
conclusion that many IAC-based targeting rules apply to NIAC as custom-
ary international law,89 a foundation for including targeting violations 
among the ICC offenses applicable to NIACs. The conclusion that these 
rules apply to NIACs is reflected in other authoritative sources, such as The 
Manual on the Law of Non-International Armed Conflicts.90  
However, the Tadić opinion offered no insight into how the legal stand-
ards for targeting decisions should translate from one domain of armed 
conflict to the other. At the core of lawful targeting is the touchstone of 
reasonableness, a touchstone that defines the proper application of the 
specific targeting rules. This is only logical, as these rules almost always in-
volve the exercise of command or leadership judgment within the frame-
                                                                                                                      
86. See supra text accompanying notes 2–5.  
87. See GC I–IV, supra note 8, art. 3.  
88. See AP II, supra note 9.  
89. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: A Contri-
bution to the Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, 87 INTERNATIONAL 
REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 175, 189 (2005). Some examples of conduct of hostilities 
rules applicable to NIAC include: prohibitions of attacks on civilians and on objects indis-
pensible to the lives of civilians; prohibitions of starvation and of the forced movement of 
the civilian population; and certain obligations to the wounded, sick and dead and to 
women and children. Id. at 188.  
90. See MICHAEL N. SCHMITT, CHARLES H. B. GARRAWAY & YORAM DINSTEIN, THE 
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work of a legal standard: a judgment that a nominated target qualifies as a 
lawful military objective; a judgment that the use of precautionary measures 
is not feasible under the circumstances; a judgment that the anticipated mil-
itary advantage from an attack outweighs the anticipated risk of excessive 
civilian injury or destruction of civilian property.91  
Because reasonableness is central to compliance with IHL’s targeting 
rules, providing greater clarity on the substantive meaning of this touch-
stone will contribute to effective implementation of the law’s objectives. 
Unfortunately, its uncertain meaning continues to undermine the effective-
ness of the law two decades after the Tadić decision. This uncertainty is es-
pecially problematic in NIACs. Unlike IACs, these conflicts often involve 
belligerent groups that are not extensively trained and organized. Training 
and organization are central to fielding a disciplined force, which in turn 
contributes to IHL compliance.92 Thus, the nature of the groups engaged in 
NIACs often dilutes IHL compliance confidence. And, because, as noted 
above, IHL compliance incentives are simply not as significant in the NI-
AC context as they are in the IAC context, the reduced expectation of 
compliance competence becomes even more problematic.  
IHL compliance in NIACs requires greater clarity on the meaning of 
reasonableness as it relates to IHL targeting compliance, and the relation-
ship between the reasonableness of weapon employment and the prepara-
tion of subordinates for their combat tasks. As I attempted to explain in a 
previous article, it is insufficient to state simply that targeting judgments 
must be reasonable;93 that axiom is beyond question. What is far less cer-
tain is what indicates whether a particular judgment is, in fact, reasonable? 
For example, what quantum of information justifies a reasonable judgment 
of lawful military objective? Or what level of training justifies a judgment 
that subordinate forces are reasonably prepared to execute their combat 
mission in accordance with the law?  
This clarity is particularly important in relation to the Tadić-based tar-
geting rule migration. Extending IAC-derived targeting rules to NIACs 
must also involve extending the IAC-based compliance related to these 
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/files/371505569.pdf.  
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rules. It is here where greater attention offers genuine potential to clarify 
the standard of reasonableness applicable to NIAC targeting decisions, and, 
in turn, enhance protection of civilians and civilian property from the 
harmful effects of indirect fires and other high explosives. More specifical-
ly, “reasonableness” should include a requirement that NIAC belliger-
ents—most importantly armed group leaders—comply with the same prac-
tical aspects of law implementation as their IAC counterparts. This will 
clarify the expectation of lawful use of highly lethal combat power, and 
provide a more objective basis for accountability when these standards are 
ignored. 
IAC targeting norms were not developed in a vacuum. Instead, they 
were informed by the practice of States that contributed to the evolution 
and adoption of these rules.94 That practice almost always involved opera-
tions by regular armed forces. While levels of training and tactical compe-
tence vary widely from one nation to another (and even from one military 
unit to another), the underlying premise of any national military force is 
that it is organized, trained and prepared to execute its combat function. 
The capacity to effectively employ the weapon systems fielded by the State 
is central to this premise.95 Indeed, training to develop tactical competence 
in the use of weapon systems is one of the unifying aspects of all military 
training.96 
IAC targeting rules were built upon this expectation. In other words, 
the rules anticipated that those employing the weapon systems regulated by 
the law would be at least minimally competent in their use. This is im-
portant, because employment competence is obviously linked to compli-
ance with IHL targeting rules. Competence also involves leaders preparing 
subordinates to execute their tactical mission in accordance with IHL ex-
pectations, which, in relation to indirect fires, means training subordinates 
to mass their explosive effects on military objectives and minimize the col-
lateral effects. 
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95. See JAMES C. CROWLEY ET AL., CHANGING THE ARMY’S WEAPON TRAINING 
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Targeting reasonableness should, therefore, be linked to competence in 
the tactical employment of lethal weapon systems and the preparation of 
forces to utilize these weapon systems in an IHL compliant manner. The 
expectation that lethal indirect fires will be employed in accordance with 
these conditions should be recognized as a component of reasonableness. 
Reasonableness is always assessed contextually; it is therefore necessary to 
consider the context in which targeting decisions are made. But this does 
not reduce the reasonableness assessment to a purely subjective standard. 
Instead, commanders are held to an objective standard of reasonable con-
duct assessed by considering the context in which the judgment was made. 
This assessment methodology supports imposing IAC-based employment 
standards on NIAC belligerents. While the unique tactical and operational 
considerations in each particular conflict will inform the assessment of rea-
sonableness, that assessment must ultimately reflect an objective standard 
of tactical competence, and, because the rules that frame lawful application 
of lethal combat power are derived from the law developed in the IAC 
domain, the IAC objective standard of tactical competence should accom-
pany that migration. 
Indeed, evidence that a commander diligently prepared subordinate 
forces in both tactical competence and an understanding of, and commit-
ment to, IHL compliance during mission execution is probative of the rea-
sonableness of the ultimate attack decisions. Unfortunately, the Tadić opin-
ion never emphasized that the migration of the IHL rules from one do-
main of armed conflict to the other necessitated a concurrent migration of 
IAC standards of reasonableness.97 Doing so is long overdue.  
Considering the training, competence, and preparation of personnel en-
trusted with lethal combat power as a factor when assessing the reasona-
bleness of targeting judgments provides a rational basis to prohibit the use 
of indirect fire systems by untrained or poorly trained belligerent groups 
who have possession of such weapon systems, a common occurrence in 
NIACs. It will also signal to leaders of these groups that training is an in-
ternationally demanded pre-condition to utilization of such weapon sys-
tems, and those leaders who authorize employment by poorly or untrained 
subordinates risk criminal responsibility for breaching their command re-
sponsibility. And, because external State sponsors frequently provide these 
systems to non-State belligerent groups, it might lead these sponsors to 
devote great effort to train end users on the proper employment of these 
                                                                                                                      












weapon systems. Furthermore, it might also enhance international legal ac-
countability for the providing State, especially where it is foreseeable that 
the recipient group is unprepared to employ the weapon system in accord-
ance with IHL obligations.  
Linking reasonableness with IAC-based standards of tactical compe-
tence will also significantly contribute to accountability. This is because the 
objective component of the assessment of targeting reasonableness will be 
based on IAC competence standards.98 By subjecting NIAC targeting to 
these IAC standards, the law will signal to NIAC belligerents that they may 
only utilize proverbial “grown up” means of warfare when they have de-
veloped maturity in competence to employ those weapons in accordance 
with “grown up” standards. It will also facilitate the critique of lethal target-
ing in NIACs by providing a more commonly adhered to baseline of objec-
tive competence.  
Focusing on employment competence will also increase the relevance 
of military operational expertise in defining and assessing the reasonable-
ness of targeting judgments in NIACs. This will enhance universal recogni-
tion and understanding of the substantive scope of regulatory rules. While 
establishing the legal framework for targeting will always necessitate reli-
ance on legal expertise,99 assessing compliance with the law must include 
the contribution of military operational experts. The perspective of such ex-
perts adds the proverbial flesh to the bones of the legal framework, provid-
ing the objective “societal” standard of conduct against which to judge a 
particular incident.  
The relevance and significance of military operational experts in the 
development and assessment of the concept of reasonableness in relation 
to lethal targeting has, unfortunately, been generally overlooked. During 
the past several decades, legal experts have assumed an increasingly central 
role in this definitional process.100 However, even when these experts pos-
sess some background in military operational art, rarely will they possess a 
level of expertise analogous to military personnel who have devoted their 
profession to the practice of military operations. Assessing what qualifies as 
a reasonable attack judgment within the meaning of IHL targeting law 
must reflect a synthesis between legal and operational expertise, and 
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providing a more significant role for operational experts will contribute to 
this objective.  
Unfortunately, the lack of clarity on the meaning of targeting reasona-
bleness has contributed to what I have characterized elsewhere as “effects-
based analysis.”101 Because the effects of combat operations are much more 
easily visualized and critiqued than is the combat decision-making process, 
it is almost inevitable that investigations, and even prosecutions, will in-
creasingly focus on destructive targeting effects. This effects-based focus, 
however, is inconsistent with fundamental tenets of the law, which demand 
reasonable combat judgments, which must be assessed contextually, and 
not based on retrospective analysis. While effects-based critique and con-
demnation may be an inevitable reality of the intersection of war, media 
and the public conscience, it must not become the standard by which mili-
tary decision makers are judged for their operational and tactical decisions. 
The risk of effects-based adjudications may be mitigated when the alleged 
war crimes are so blatant that there is no meaningful debate over the objec-
tive reasonableness of command judgments. However, as allegations of 
battlefield misconduct trend away from the blatantly unlawful to complex 
tactical and operational judgments, this risk is substantially more palpable.  
Effects are probative in that they provide circumstantial evidence that 
is relevant to assess targeting reasonableness. But they are not conclusive. 
Effects must be considered along with the totality of all other relevant in-
formation when assessing targeting legality, such as tactical competence, 
training, preparation and other indications of good faith commitment to 
IHL compliance. This aspect of the legality critique is not within the exclu-
sive, or perhaps even primary, domain of international legal experts. Mili-
tary operational experts are, in contrast, highly competent to offer insight 
into how these aspects of mission execution reflect on the overall legality 
assessment. Emphasis on the relationship between these aspects of military 
operations and the ultimate touchstone of reasonableness will enhance the 
contributions of such experts, and, over time, provide greater clarity to 
“what right looks like.” 
 
C. The Ukrainian Illustration 
 
Two aspects of the armed conflict in Ukraine illustrate the potential benefit 
of extending operational practice standards and IHL targeting rules to NI-
                                                                                                                      












ACs: the Malaysian Air aircraft shoot down and the use of indirect fires in 
populated areas. 
By most credible accounts, Ukrainian rebels, utilizing an advanced air 
defense missile system, were responsible for the shoot down of Malaysian 
Air Flight 17.102 In the unlikely event any of the responsible actors are 
brought to trial for this tragedy, they will not be able to credibly assert that 
they engaged a lawful military target. Instead, it is likely they will respond to 
any accusation of unlawful attack by asserting they made a reasonable error 
in judgment: they believed the airliner was a lawful object of attack, a belief 
that, although mistaken, was reasonable under the circumstances due to the 
use of the same airspace by Ukrainian military aircraft. 
There is evidence to support the conclusion that this was a deliberate 
attack on a known civilian airliner;103 evidence which could lead to a rela-
tively easy finding of an unlawful deliberate attack on civilians and civilian 
property. But if the question of reasonable mistake were to arise, the rela-
tive tactical competence and preparation of the forces employing the 
weapon system should play an important role in this assessment. In other 
words, merely utilizing the system without sufficient training and prepara-
tion could itself establish the unreasonableness of the employment judg-
ment. This is because this type of mistake is a foreseeable consequence of 
fielding advanced combat capability without properly training forces to use 
that capability in compliance with IHL obligations. And how would the 
adequacy of the pre-employment preparation be assessed? Ideally by com-
paring the actual preparation with the preparation utilized by professional 
military forces engaged in an IAC. Ultimately, the reasonableness of any 
alleged targeting error should be significantly influenced by the extent of 
the difference between these two standards.  
Use of indirect fires, most notably GRAD missiles, in densely populat-
ed areas provides another illustration of the relevance of IAC employment 
standards in the assessment of targeting legality. Reports indicated that 
both rebel and government forces have periodically fired GRAD surface-
to-surface missiles with high-explosive warheads into densely populated 
areas.104 As with the Malaysian Air shoot down, a clear violation of the IHL 
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rule of distinction would be established by proof these attacks were delib-
erately directed at civilians and/or civilian property. It is more likely, how-
ever, that they were directed at what the attacking commander determined 
were military objectives located in the midst of the civilian population. 
Where this was the case, the assessment of legality will turn on the reason-
ableness of several critical judgments. 
First, there is the judgment that the target would qualify as a lawful mil-
itary objective.105 Second, there is the judgment that it would not be feasible 
to use an alternate means or method of warfare that would reduce civilian 
risk and achieve the intended tactical effect.106 Third, there is the judgment 
that the anticipated incidental civilian harm would not be excessive com-
pared to the anticipated military advantage.107 And finally, there is the 
judgment that use of surface-to-surface missiles in that context would not 
be inherently indiscriminate, i.e., that the weapon could be directed to a 
specific military target with sufficient precision.108 
These attacks have caused substantial harm to civilians and civilian 
property. Indeed, their adverse effects have contributed to the momentum 
building for completely banning the use of such weapons in populated are-
as. But as noted above, “effects-based condemnation” may be appealing, 
but is inconsistent with the IHL targeting regime. Reasonableness must be 
the critical focal point to assess compliance with this regime. The target 
identification and engagement procedures and training standards for weap-
on systems operators used by regular armed forces engaged in IACs pro-
vide a useful baseline for this assessment. This baseline is objective, be-
cause it is grounded in the practice of armed forces equipped with this type 
of lethal weaponry. By relying on military operational expertise, it is also a 
feasible baseline to develop during investigations and criminal prosecu-
tions. Finally, it is a credible baseline, because condemnation for use—
stemming from an objectively defective judgment related to any of the key 
legal questions implicated by the use of this weaponry—would be based on 
deviation from accepted operational practices. Importantly, this would in-
clude the reasonableness of unleashing these weapon systems without ade-
quate target legality assessment, training of operators and command over-
sight of mission execution. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
 
Armed conflicts are by their very nature among the most brutal collective 
endeavors known to human society. But all is not fair in war, and conflict 
regulation is deeply rooted in international law. During the past century, 
this law has seen the balance of interests between State sovereignty and 
protection of humanity shift gradually, yet continuously, in favor of the 
protection of war victims. And, perhaps because non-international armed 
conflicts have become the predominant form of warfare, this trend in-
spired the extension of conflict regulatory norms originally developed for 
inter-State warfare into this pervasive domain of brutal hostilities. 
This extension has been essential to build a foundation for both regula-
tion of these conflicts and accountability for participants whose conduct 
transgresses international legal standards. Unfortunately, the aspiration be-
hind this extension—to enhance the protection of war victims by demand-
ing respect for core conduct of hostilities rules during any armed conflict—
has been frustrated by an overall failure of compliance. The track record of 
international humanitarian law violations—brutality, excessive uses of 
force, unlawful targeting and other violations of basic international human-
itarian law obligations—associated with these armed conflicts is so perva-
sive that it almost numbs international reaction. Regrettably, the excesses in 
the Ukrainian conflict are not exceptional, but just the most recent example 
of the continuing divide between the NIAC conflict regulation aspiration 
and reality. 
Improving this state of affairs is essential, but the solution is not new 
law, or arbitrary and unrealistic prohibitions on the use of widely available 
combat capabilities such as artillery and rocket assets. Instead, incentives 
for compliance must be reconceived, disincentives for non-compliance en-
hanced and standards of compliance with conduct of hostilities norms bet-
ter defined, most notably how compliance with the central touchstone of 
reasonableness in targeting judgments should be assessed. This article has 
suggested several approaches along these lines.  
New approaches are needed to close the gulf between the aspiration of 
more effective NIAC regulation that is central to the Tadić decision, and 
the reality of humanitarian suffering that continues to define these con-
flicts. There is, however, no easy solution to this problem of international 
law non-compliance during NIACs, and these suggestions are no panacea. 












conflicts, and the axiom that it is always error to reinforce failure. If noth-
ing else, it is hoped they will stimulate new ideas that may ultimately pro-
duce a reality consistent with aspiration. 
